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Taking its place 
in Europe – 
Iceland’s long 
road to its EU 
application 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Iceland applied for EU membership in 2009. 
Before that it had sought to alleviate pressures 
on her to fully integrate with Europe firstly by 
pursuing limited  integration through 
membership of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and later by joining the 
European Economic Area (EEA). This paper 
traces the steps taken by this peripheral 
European country from itsstruggle of 
independence from Denmark, through World 
War II, American occupation, the founding of 
a republic, NATO membership and the Cod 
Wars with Britain. The paper analyses the 
various phases of the debate on the ties to the 
European institutions leading to EEA and 
Schengen membership, the “miraculous 
economic success“ which ended in the epic 
crash of 2008 which precipitated a much 
contested EU application 
 
Introduction 
 
Iceland applied for EU membership on16 July 
2009. That ended a long road towards an 
application from this small peripheral 
European country that had resisted fully 
integrating with the EU for almost half a 
century. In the meantime, Iceland had adopted 
almost all the main obligations of integration 
through the deepest cooperation framework the 
European Union has with any third country: 
the European Economic Area (EEA). Just like 
Norway, Liechtenstein, and, after a long and 
arduous process, Switzerland, Iceland has also 
joined Schengen, and is thus more deeply 
integrated with the Union in that domain than 
some EU countries such as Britain and Ireland.  
 
The membership application started a new 
process, that has, because of the political 
situation in Iceland, the potential of becoming 
relatively dramatic. In fact, it is something of a 
miracle that it is happening in the first place, 
considering that only one of the five parties 
represented in Iceland’s parliament, the 
Alþingi, in the 2009-2013 parliamentary term, 
supports it and views EU membership 
positively. Also, according to opinion polls, 
Icelanders do not seem to have warmed up to 
the idea of joining the Union. In the last three 
years opposition to membership averaged 
between 60-70 percent of voters.
1
  
 
This paper attempts to describe the long road 
towards Iceland’s EU application in the light of 
Icelandic nationalism, the interests of its 
leading sectors, the political landscape and 
ponders the difficulties facing the final stages 
of this process.  
 
The making of a modern state 
 
The genesis of Iceland’s struggle for 
independence‖ has sometimes been traced to 
the writings of Eggert Ólafsson (1726-68), a 
naturalist, poet and royal official, whose ideas 
of the preservation of the Icelandic language 
and exaltation of the Icelandic “Golden Age” 
blended well with the romantic ideals of 
nineteenth-century nationalists. But nothing 
could have been further from Ólafsson’s mind 
than wishing for some form of independent 
Icelandic state. On the contrary, he was a 
staunch royalist, who ardently believed in the 
benefits of belonging to the Danish crown , to 
                                                 
1 Capacent Gallup, (2012), Viðhorf almennings til ESB, 
Reykjavík, Capacent. 
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which Iceland had belonged for several 
centuries.
2
  
During the 1830s and 1840s a nationalist 
paradigm shift took place among the Icelandic 
student community in Copenhagen. The new 
perspective was based on the belief that the 
rule of one nation over another was in principle 
unnatural and had thus to be averted.
3
 The 
students and scholars participating in the 
debate were influenced by  nationalism which 
had gripped Europe during that century leading 
to the creation of the nation-states we are 
familiar with today. From the latter half of the 
nineteenth, to the first half of the twentieth 
century, Iceland gradually gained 
independence from Denmark in a few 
successive steps: in 1845, a resurrected 
parliament, the Alþingi, convened for the first 
time in Reykjavík; in 1874, Iceland received its 
first constitution, giving the Alþingi limited 
legislative power and responsibility for the 
Icelandic budget; in 1904, it was granted Home 
Rule, with a minister of Icelandic affairs 
residing in Reykjavík and responsible to the 
Alþingi; in 1918, the Act of the Union, by 
which Iceland was declared a sovereign state 
sharing a monarch with Denmark
4
 and finally, 
the founding of the Republic of Iceland on the 
17 June 1944.  
 
On the economic front, following the 
difficulties in the second half of the 19th 
century, which saw emigration to America 
grow significantly, a strong economic upswing 
occurred in the first three decades of the 
                                                 
2 Hálfdanarson, G. (2006), ‘Language, Identity and Political 
Integration. Iceland in the Age of Enlightenment‘, in H. 
Gustafsson, & H. Sanders (eds.), Vid gränsen. Integration och 
identiteter i det förnationella Norden, Gothenburg, Makadam 
and Centre for Danish Studies, the University of Lund, pp. 
230–247. 
3 Ibid., p. 241. 
4 Hálfdanarson, G. (2001a), ‘Icelandic Nationalism: A Non-
Violent Paradigm?‘, in G. Hálfdanarson, & A. Isaacs (eds.), 
Nations and Nationalities in Historical Perspective, Pisa, 
Edizioni Plus, p. 7. 
twentieth century due to the introduction of 
new fishing techniques and the modernization 
of the infrastructure including the building of 
bridges, roads and telecommunications systems 
and the founding of banks and other financial 
institutions.
5
 The period 1912-30 was 
described as the most revolutionary period of 
the Icelandic economy.
6
 Iceland’s route to 
economic development followed the textbook 
model on how small states adapt to the 
international economy – by exporting one or 
two main goods according to their comparative 
advantage. In Iceland’s case it was fish.7 
 
The Effect of World War II 
 
On the 10 May 1940, British troops occupied 
Iceland. The Americans gradually replaced the 
British in 1941, and then in 1942 about 50,000 
soldiers were stationed in Iceland, most of 
them around Reykjavík. During the first years 
of occupation, there were more British and 
American than Icelandic men in Reykjavík.
8
 
Unemployment in Reykjavík, which had been 
significant before the war, was eradicated in 
the first months of the occupation,
9
 as the 
occupying forces struggled to upgrade the 
Icelandic infrastructure, building airports and 
roads and preparing to defend the country in 
the event of a German invasion.
10
 Iceland, 
which in 1939 was heavily indebted, managed 
                                                 
5 Jónsson, G. (2002), ‘Hagþróun og hagvöxtur á Íslandi 1914-
1960‘, in J. H. Haralz (ed.), Frá kreppu til viðreisnar; Þættir 
um hagstjórn á Íslandi á árunum 1930-1960, Reykjavík, Hið 
íslenska bókmenntafélag, p. 14. 
6 Magnússon, M. S. (1985), Iceland in Transition; Labour and 
socio-economic change before 1940, Lund, Ekonomisk-
Historiska Föreningen, p. 89 
7 Jónsson G. 2002, pp. 15-7 
8 Bernharðsson, E. Þ. (1996), Blórabögglar og olnbogabörn, 
Sagnir, 17. ár, p. 12 
9 Icelandic Government (2007), Landsframleiðsla og 
þjóðarframleiðsla 1945-1990, website of the Icelandic 
Government at www2.stjr.is/frr/thst/rit/sogulegt/index.htm#5 
(viewed in: July 2007). 
10 Snævarr, S. (1993), Haglýsing Íslands, Reykjavík, 
Heimskringla, p. 43 
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during the five years of occupation, to become 
one of the wealthiest nations (per capita) in 
Europe.
11
  
 
Icelandic Nationalism triumphed after World 
War II following the successful struggle for 
independence, and attempts at bringing Iceland 
into Western security cooperation were 
strongly resisted by nationalist forces, fearing 
the loss of  the benefits of independence.
12
 
During the war, Iceland had acquired the 
support of the United States, and President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt had declared when 
Sveinn Björnsson, the first Icelandic president 
visited the White House in August 1944 that 
the US would after the restoration of world 
peace, recognize and work for the complete 
independence Iceland.
13
 The American motive 
was not altogether altruistic, since the US had 
begun to see the benefits of maintaining a 
military presence in this strategically situated 
island in the North Atlantic.
14
   
 
When the American authorities asked for 
permission to maintain a military base in 
Iceland, this put pressure on Icelandic 
politicians to take security issues seriously. 
Voters’ opposed this proposal since a 
declaration of permanent neutrality had been 
an element of Iceland’s sovereignty since 
1918.
15
 After the war and with the advent of 
the Cold War, it dawned on the Icelandic 
authorities that neutrality was not sustainable. 
The American military left the country and the 
government started working towards an 
agreement, which, among other things, ensured 
                                                 
11 Whitehead, Þ. (1991), Leiðin frá hlutleysi 1945-1949, Saga, 
tímarit Sögufélags, p. 64 
12 Kristinsson, G. H. (1991), ‚Iceland‘, in H. Wallace (ed.), The 
Wider Western Europe, London, Pinter, p. 160 
13 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, quoted in Kristjánsson, S. 
(2001), Forsetinn og utanríkisstefnan, Ný saga, tímarit 
Sögufélags, 13. árg., pp. 4-16. 
14 Kristjánsson, 2001, p. 12 
15 Whitehead, 1991, p. 112 
traffic of American aircraft through Iceland’s 
international airport in Keflavík. An agreement 
was signed in the autumn of 1946. From an 
Icelandic standpoint, the purpose of the 
agreement – although not explicitly stated – 
was to maintain the economic prosperity of the 
war years.
16
  
 
In between1948-50, Iceland’s foreign trade 
was mainly with Britain and the US. Although 
the Icelandic government accepted the first 
payment of Marshall aid reluctantly, its 
reluctance vanished quickly. Icelanders soon 
earned a name for being the greediest of all for 
aid, though they were not very keen on loans. 
The Marshall Plan helped to close the annual 
trade gap, subsidized exports to Europe and 
provided large sums for the development of 
infrastructure.
17
 The aim of the Americans was 
to acquire a permanent base in Iceland. In the 
meantime they made sure that Bjarni 
Benediktsson, the Foreign Minister at the time 
and later leader of the Independence Party, 
understood that their financial aid depended on 
communists being kept out of government.
18
  
 
Nationalist rhetoric instigated the first political 
riots in the history of the Republic when on 30 
March 1949, the Icelandic parliament met to 
ratify Iceland’s membership of NATO. The 
police and reserves used batons and tear gas to 
disperse the crowd.
19
 But since Iceland had no 
intention of having its own army, many 
Icelanders welcomed US military protection so 
that in the parliamentary vote, 37 voted for 
membership and 13 against.
20
 In 1951 Iceland 
                                                 
16 Ibid., p. 72 
17 Ibid., p. 81 
18 Ibid. 
19 Whitehead, Þ. (2006), Smáríki og heimsbyltingin; Um öryggi 
Íslands á válegum tímum, Þjóðmál, haust, pp. 66-8 
20 Harðarson, Ó. Þ. (1998), Public Opinion and Iceland’s 
Western Integration, a paper submitted at the Conference on 
the Nordic Countries and the Cold War: International 
Perspectives and Interpretations, June 24-27, Reykjavík, p. 3 
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signed an agreement with the US guaranteeing 
Iceland’s defence. A military base was later set 
up close to the airport at Keflavík.  
 
The first years of the republic were also 
turbulent in economic terms. An urgent need 
was felt to renew production facilities and 
overcome housing shortages and, partly under 
the influence of a strengthened labour 
movement, more emphasis was placed on 
direct investment, mainly in the fishing 
industry. The prosperity of the war years did 
not change the Icelandic government’s mind 
set towards their sectoral policy. They 
continued to support the basic industries, 
fisheries and agriculture, as best they could. 
Though they understood that agriculture could 
not spearhead the island’s economic 
development, they believed in its export 
potential.
21
 The foreign-currency reserves 
accumulated during the war were exhausted in 
two years.
22
 This set the stage for Icelandic 
economic policy for a decade and a half. 
Although this approach might have been in line 
with the prevalent economic thought at the end 
of the war, later, when the Western world 
began dismantling protectionist barriers and 
liberalising trade, Iceland headed in the 
opposite direction going as far as to maintain 
an exchange rate for its currency which 
benefited the fishing industry at the expense of 
other economic sectors – in short, a textbook 
example of what economists call “the Dutch 
disease”23. In the years 1948-52, GDP suffered 
                                                 
21 Jónsson G. 2002, p. 26 
22 Whitehead, 1991, p. 78 
23 Daníelsson, J., & Zoega, G, (2009), Hagkerfi býður skipbrot 
- Skýrsla Gylfa Zoega og Jóns Daníelssonar, Website of the 
University of Iceland (Háskóli Íslands) at 
http://www.hi.is/files/skjol/felagsvisindasvid/deildir/hagfraedi/
2008_2009/Hagkerfib____ur_skipbrot.pdf (viewed on 
24.03.2009). The term ―the Dutch disease comes from the 
fact that the Netherlands experienced major shifts in domestic 
production following the discovery of substantial gas deposits 
in the 1960s. As the exports of this natural resource boomed, 
the guilder appreciated in real terms, thereby squeezing the 
profitability of other exports, especially manufactured goods 
a yearly contraction of c. 3% and did not regain 
its 1947 level until 1954.
24
 
 
Early moves towards European 
integration 
 
The cornerstone of Icelandic foreign policy 
from the founding of the republic was to secure 
full and undisputed control of the fishing 
resources on its continental shelf. This 
objective loomed large in all efforts to join any 
form of European cooperation.
25
 Thus, even 
though Iceland had participated fully in an 
effort to establish a free-trade association 
between the six nations forming the EEC and 
the rest of the OEEC nations in 1957-58,  when 
discussions started to form EFTA, Iceland 
(together with Greece, Spain, Ireland and 
Turkey), was not invited to participate. The 
obvious reason was the serious dispute with 
Britain at the time over Iceland’s extension of 
its fishing limits to twelve miles.
26
 Another 
reason is that EFTA was mostly intended as a 
free-trade area for industrial goods, and only to 
a very limited extent for agricultural and 
fisheries products. With the exception of the 
fishing industry, Iceland had not really 
developed industrial production of its own. Its 
economic policy, which had been dogged by 
state intervention and restrictions on imports, 
was also such that it would have been 
inconceivable for it to become a founding 
member of EFTA.  
 
                                                                             
(Sachs, J. D. and F. B. Larrain (1993), Macroeconomics in the 
Global Economy, Prentice Hall. pp. 668-9).  
24 Icelandic Government Website, 2007 
25 Benediktsson, E. (2003), Iceland and European 
Development, A historical review from a personal perspective, 
Reykjavík, Almenna bókafélagið, p. 47 
26 Gíslason, G. Þ. (1993), Viðreisnarárin, Reykjavík, Almenna 
bókafélagið, p. 199; Ólason, Ó. K. (2002), "Politically 
impossible", EFTA-umsókn í kjölfar þorskastríðs, in E. H. 
Halldórsdóttir (ed.), 2. íslenska söguþingið, 30. maí - 1. júní 
2002 (pp. 426-35). Reykjavík: Sagnfræðistofnun Háskóla 
Íslands, Sagnfræðingafélag Íslands, Sögufélag, pp. 426-35. 
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In 1959 a new government, consisting of the 
conservative Independence Party and the 
Social Democratic Party, started to rethink 
Iceland’s attitude towards joining the EEC. In 
the 1960s this coalition, referred to as the 
Government of Reconstruction 
(Viðreisnarstjórnin), took major steps to open 
up the economy. The government followed 
closely what was happening in the EEC. A 
committee was appointed in 1961 (Nefndin um 
fríverzlunarmál) to look into the possibility of 
Iceland joining EFTA in order to strengthen its 
bargaining position with the EC on free trade 
in fish. The committee recommended that 
Iceland should apply for membership of EFTA 
and negotiate an adaptation period and several 
exemptions, even if it foresaw the eventual 
merger of EFTA and the EEC
27
. Many serious 
obstacles hampered Iceland’s attempt to join 
EFTA and Icelandic officials were made aware 
of this especially by the British.
28
 Following 
the Cod War of 1958-61, the UK was very 
reluctant to let Iceland join EFTA.
29
 
Nevertheless, Iceland pressed ahead by 
lobbying the other Nordic countries. Iceland’s 
possible membership of EFTA was discussed 
by EFTA in June 1961.
30
 As part of this 
approach to EFTA, the Government of 
Reconstruction was also aiming to reduce trade 
relations with Eastern Europe, which were 
significant at the time, and to increase trade 
with Western Europe and the US.  
 
At the end of July 1961 it was becoming clear 
that EFTA and the EC would not merge, and 
that Britain and several other EFTA states 
would seek to join the EC. The Minister of 
                                                 
27 Thorhallsson, B., & Vignisson, H. T. (2004), The first steps, 
Iceland’s policy on European integration from the foundation 
of the republic to 1972, in B. Thorhallsson (ed.), Iceland and 
European integration, on the edge, London, Routledge, p. 25. 
28 Benediktsson E., 2003, pp. 94-6 
29 Ólason, 2002, pp. 434-5 
30 Morgunblaðið, (1961, June 28), ‘Aðild Íslands að EFTA 
rædd‘, Morgunblaðið‘, Reykjavík. p. 1 
Commerce, Gylfi Þ. Gíslason met the social 
partners in Iceland several times in August 
1961 to discuss the issue. These meetings 
concluded in a resolution in which all the 
social partners’ organisations, except for the 
Icelandic Confederation of Labour (ASÍ), 
stated their support for an Icelandic application 
for membership of the EEC. These 15 
organisations included the Farmers’ 
Association, the Federation of Icelandic 
Fishing Vessel Owners (LÍÚ), and other 
organisations of the fishing industry.
31
 The 
Farmers’ Association, however, soon retracted 
its support, since substantial doubts had arisen 
amongst farmers on the merits of EC 
membership.
32
 In the summer and autumn of 
1961 the government seriously considered 
three options: membership of the EEC, 
associate membership of the EEC, though no 
one really knew what this would entail and, 
thirdly, a customs agreement with the EEC.
33
 
The main strategy was to ensure that Iceland 
would retain influence on matters of vital 
concern to it within the Community. Gíslason 
toured European capitals in 1961 to discuss 
Iceland’s position with European leaders and 
the European Commission in Brussels.
34
 That 
trip and further contacts by the Icelandic 
government showed that most European 
statesmen considered Association with the EC 
or a customs union as the best choice in the 
circumstances
35
 a position also favoured by 
Iceland.
36
  
 
The government thus decided to apply for an 
Association Agreement with the EEC,
37
 but all 
                                                 
31 Morgunblaðið, (1961, August 18), ‘Samtök 
meginatvinnuvega Íslendinga styðja: Inntökubeiðni í 
Efnahagsbandalagið‘, Morgunblaðið, p. 1. 
32 Thorhallsson & Vignisson, 2004, p. 27 
33 Gíslason, 1993, p. 201 
34 Ibid.,  p. 203 
35 Ibid., p. 204 
36 Benediktsson E. 2003, p. 106 
37 Thorhallsson & Vignisson, 2004, p. 27 
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efforts stopped when Britain’s application was 
vetoed by De Gaulle. Iceland did not revive the 
issue until 1967.
38
 However, it featured in the 
1963 national election campaign, with 
emphasis on the question of sovereignty and 
the different fisheries policies of Iceland and 
the EEC.
39
 The battle lines were drawn 
between government and opposition, with the 
socialist People’s Alliance strongly appealing 
to nationalistic sympathies followed to a lesser 
extent by the Progressive Party.
40
   
 
Joining EFTA 
 
The Icelandic government began to re-examine 
EFTA membership in order to pull the country 
out of the severe economic downswing that 
had taken hold during the second half of the 
1960s. It was intended to help revive other 
industries apart from the fishing industry. But 
reaching an agreement with the EC on lower 
tariffs on fish exports was still perceived as a 
key priority.
41
 There were also worries that 
Iceland’s position in Nordic co-operation was 
under threat since this had practically been 
taken over by EFTA after its inception.
42
 Also, 
government officials noted a significant change 
in EFTA towards Icelandic membership
43
 and 
the British themselves had even, as part of a 
strategy to strengthen EFTA, proposed 
bringing Iceland and Ireland into the 
association.
44
 The process of joining EFTA 
was formally launched in December 1967 with 
the appointment of a committee of all parties 
represented in the parliament, which 
extensively consulted the social partners and 
                                                 
38 Gíslason, 1993, p. 204 
39 Benediktsson E. 2003, p. 109 
40 Thorhallsson & Vignisson, 2004, p. 28 
41 Snævarr, S. (1993), Haglýsing Íslands, Reykjavík, 
Heimskringla, p. 356 
42 Thorhallsson & Vignisson, 2004, p. 29 
43 Benediktsson E., 2003, pp. 118-9 
44 Thorhallsson & Vignisson, 2004, p. 28 
organisations representing fisheries, 
agriculture, industry and commerce.  
 
The Icelandic parliament voted to apply for 
membership of EFTA on 12 November 1968.
45
 
A small protest took place outside the 
Parliament while the vote was being taken and 
some, alleged to be young socialists, broke a 
few windows.
46
 The socialist newspaper 
Þjóðviljinn however claimed the demonstration 
was peaceful.
47
  
 
Iceland joined EFTA in March 1970. In 1972 it 
concluded negotiations on a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) with the EC (together with 
the other EFTA countries) comprising a 
significant lowering of tariffs on fish exports. 
Until 1971, Icelandic political elites had been 
deeply divided on closer ties to Western 
Europe, some holding them to be unnecessary, 
further arguing that Iceland should not 
participate in supranational organisations, since 
this would weaken its sovereignty and 
independence and give foreign companies the 
opportunity to run businesses in Iceland. The 
People’s Alliance categorically opposed any 
participation in Western European economic 
organisations, and the Progressives took a 
“wait and see” position. The Opposition 
criticized the government depicting the free 
trade agreement with the EC as a betrayal, an 
agreement laying the ground for full EC 
membership. The government considered 
Iceland’s membership of EFTA as a necessary 
step for the good of the Icelandic economy, 
and did not think it would weaken 
sovereignty.
48
  
Agricultural sector interest groups had 
supported EFTA membership, but changed 
                                                 
45 Ibid., p. 30 
46 Morgunblaðið (1968, November 13), ‘Samþykkt með 35 
gegn 14‘, Morgunblaðið, p. 2 
47 Þjóðviljinn, 13 November. (1968, November 13), ‘Ákveðið 
að Ísland tengist hagsmunafélagi auðríkja‘, Þjóðviljinn, p. 2 
48 Gíslason, 1993, p. 215 
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their position in 1969. It has been argued that 
the close connection between these interest 
groups and the Progressive Party was the main 
reason for this policy change despite the 
relatively good terms that had been negotiated 
on increased exports of lamb to the other 
Nordic countries. Interest groups representing 
industry were always strongly in favour of 
EFTA membership, even if it could be argued 
that in the short run, the most severe impact of 
membership would be felt by the country’s 
industrial sector.
49
  
 
The Government of Reconstruction finally lost 
its majority in 1971. But in spite of their 
serious opposition to EFTA in parliament, the 
Progressive Party and the People’s Alliance 
took no measures to leave EFTA when they, 
together with the Union of Liberals and 
Leftists, eventually formed a government.
50
 
Lúðvík Jósepsson, the new Minister of 
Commerce and leader of the People’s Alliance, 
took over responsibility for the country’s 
relations with EFTA, pursuing the path 
previously taken by Gíslason. The political 
consensus was that since the country had 
already joined EFTA, membership was to be 
supported actively.
51
  
 
Iceland unilaterally extended its fishing limits 
in 1972 to 50 miles and again in 1975 to 200 
miles. These moves were fiercely resisted by 
Britain, which had fished in these waters for a 
long time. Britain dispatched naval vessels to 
guard its fishing boats in the disputed waters. 
The Cod Wars delayed full implementation of 
the free trade agreement with the EC until 
Britain eventually recognized the 200-mile 
fishing limit.  
 
                                                 
49 Thorhallsson & Vignisson, 2004, p. 32 
50 Gíslason, 1993, p. 215 
51 Benediktsson E. 2003, p. 133 
The effect of the Cod Wars on the Icelandic 
psyche should not be underestimated. The 
nationalist rhetoric was unleashed, especially 
between 1972-3, against the British naval 
presence in the waters claimed by Iceland. 
Opposition to NATO and Western cooperation 
increased.
52
 Ingimundarson argues that at this 
time, two nationalist currents met and merged: 
traditional western nationalism, based on 19th 
century ideals and anti-western, third-world 
type nationalism that can arise when a great 
power (Britain) is seen to be jeopardizing the 
future and the economic independence of a 
small nation. Anger was directed at Britain, as 
the enemy, the US for not protecting Iceland, 
the international tribunal in The Hague for 
siding with Britain and at the other Nordic 
countries for not standing up for Iceland.
53
 
 
The EEA 
 
After joining EFTA, closer involvement in 
European integration was not considered 
necessary in Iceland or the other Nordic 
countries except Denmark, since the free-trade 
agreements between the EC and the EFTA 
states which took effect in 1973 had led to a 
quadrupling of the volume of trade between 
EFTA and the EC in the period 1972-86.
54
 
This, however, led to increasing pressures, 
especially since the EC member states were 
deepening their integration, and in the late 
1980s the EFTA countries’ diplomats in 
Brussels were beginning to express their 
worries to the EC Commission, that they were 
being left out of the dynamic internal market 
that was due to be achieved by 1992.
55
 On 17 
January 1989, while addressing the European 
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Parliament in Strasbourg, Commission 
President Jacques Delors proposed a new, 
more structured partnership for the EFTA 
countries comprising common decision-
making and administrative institutions. This 
was to become the European Economic Area, 
(EEA) negotiated between EFTA and the EC 
in 1989-92.  
 
The EEA had first been mentioned in 1984 in 
the European Council’s Luxembourg 
Declaration, which was the result of an EC-
EFTA ministerial meeting held in Luxembourg 
in April of that year. It mentioned several ways 
of clearing trade barriers between the two 
organisations and to promote competition. But 
Delors’ 1989 declaration went further than 
what was originally proposed in 1984. Delors 
also wanted to tell the EFTA countries that it 
would be impossible for them to join the EC, 
not at least until after the completion of the 
internal market in 1993.
56
  
 
Joining the EC was also hampered by the 
neutrality of Sweden, Finland, Austria and 
Switzerland. But the EFTA countries reacted 
positively to Delors’ proposal. To the neutral 
countries, neutrality was still incongruent with 
EC membership, since most EC member states 
except Ireland were all in NATO, while 
Norway and Iceland which were in NATO 
perceived the benefits of improving their 
access to the European markets without 
surrendering much of their cherished 
sovereignty.
57
 Delors’ Declaration proved 
unsuccessful in fending off EC applications 
from the EFTA countries, and Austria became 
the first one to apply for EC membership on 
July 1, 1989. Austria’s application immediately 
raised some difficult questions on the 
compatibility of neutrality in international 
                                                 
56 Stephensen, Ó. Þ. (1996), Áfangi á Evrópuför, Reykjavík, 
Háskólaútgáfan, p. 30 
57 Ibid., p. 31 
affairs with the EC’s efforts to strengthen 
cooperation in foreign policy and security.
58
  
 
The EEA negotiations were described by one 
of the European Commission’s chief 
negotiators as the most complex that the EC 
had ever been involved in. The EFTA countries 
had to adopt, on the internal market alone, 
approximately 1,400 existing EC acts, covering 
over 10,000 pages of legislation. Time and 
again, the negotiations were bogged down by 
disputes over issues ranging from fishing 
rights, alpine trucking and financial support for 
the EC’s poorer members. The agreement was 
finally signed on October 22, 1991, only to see 
its proposed EFTA-EC court declared to be in 
contravention of EC law by the European 
Court of Justice. Renewed negotiations ended 
in a compromise in February 1992.
59
  
 
The Icelandic government at the start of the 
negotiations on the EEA agreement was made 
up of a coalition of parties led by the 
Progressive Party, with the party leader, 
Steingrímur Hermannsson, as Prime Minister. 
The other coalition partners were the Social 
Democratic Party led by Jón Baldvin 
Hannibalsson who held the Foreign Ministry 
portfolio and the People’s Alliance led by 
Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson (later President of 
Iceland) as Finance Minister. Elections were 
due in 1991, but during the campaign both the 
Progressive Party and the People’s Alliance 
criticised the EEA negotiations.
60
 The 
Independence Party, which in opposition under 
the leadership of Þorsteinn Pálsson had been in 
favour of bilateral negotiations with the EC on 
fisheries, rather than focusing on the EEA, 
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59 Ibid. 
60 Thorhallsson, B. (2008), Evrópustefna íslenskra stjórnvalda: 
Stefnumótun, átök og afleiðingar, in V. Ingimundarson (ed.), 
Uppbrot hugmyndakerfis; Endurmótun 
íslenskrarutanríkisstefnu 1991-2007, Reykjavík, Hið íslenska 
bókmenntafélag. p. 79. 
 12 
 
elected Davíð Oddsson as leader during the 
campaign and he seemed more positive 
towards the EEA Agreement and European 
integration in general. Hannibalsson believed 
that Oddsson was a liberal Europhile and this 
strongly contributed to the formation of a new 
government consisting of the IP and the SDP in 
the spring of 1991 under Oddsson’s leadership, 
with Hannibalsson continuing as Foreign 
Minister.
61
 The EEA negotiations for Iceland 
went on unhindered and on 2 May 1992 the 
agreement was signed in Porto, subject to 
approval by the individual national 
parliaments.
62
  
 
In parliament, as in the negotiations on EFTA 
accession, the position of the political parties 
depended roughly on whether they were in 
government or not. Ironically, the same parties 
that had fought for, and concluded, Iceland’s 
EFTA accession, namely the Independence 
Party and the Social Democratic Party, were 
now negotiating its entry into the EEA while 
the Progressive Party, the People’s Alliance, 
and the Women’s Alliance which were in 
opposition opposed it. Ratification took place 
on 12 January 1993 with thirty-three members 
in favour, 23 against and seven abstentions.
63
 
 
Digesting Europe: From EEA to EU 
application   
 
Following the ratification of the EEA 
Agreement, Icelandic Europhiles celebrated 
victory. The Foreign Minister, Hannibalsson, 
became increasingly positive towards 
following other Nordic applicants into the 
                                                 
61 Ibid., pp. 80-3 
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5964. 
European Union.  At its 1994 Congress, his 
Social Democratic Party adopted a position 
that Iceland should apply for EU membership 
as soon as possible. Later that year Norwegian 
voters rejected EU membership which meant 
that the EEA would somehow survive. 
Unfortunately for them, during the 1995 
Icelandic electoral campaign, the negative vote 
in Norway prevented the Icelandic social 
democrats from gaining more support for their 
membership proposal.
64
 For domestic political 
reasons, the Social Democrats performed very 
poorly, receiving about 11 per cent of the vote. 
The party had split, with a popular vice-
chairman and government minister, Jóhanna 
Sigurðardóttir, founding her own party
65
 which 
received more or less the support that the SDP 
had lost. The government retained a majority 
of only one parliamentary seat. The Prime 
Minister, Davíð Oddsson, decided to swap 
coalition partners and the Progressive Party 
replaced the Social Democratic Party in 
government with Oddsson’s Independence 
Party.
66
 After the ratification of the EEA 
Agreement, Oddsson became increasingly 
sceptical towards the EU, and definitely did not 
share Hannibalsson’s enthusiasm for 
membership. The EEA issue had been difficult 
for the IP and the party leadership saw it as the 
furthest step that Iceland could take in the 
European integration process for three reasons 
– it was sufficient as a method of ensuring the 
country’s commercial and economic interests; 
secondly, further integration might harm the 
interests of the fishing industry, and thirdly, it 
was a means of avoiding a full-blown split 
within the Independence Party on EU 
matters.
67
 Thus the new government removed 
the EU membership issue from the political 
                                                 
64 Kristinsson, G. H. (1995), ‘The Icelandic Parliamentary 
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65 Ibid., p. 334 
66 Ibid., p. 335 
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agenda while stressing the unacceptability of 
the EU’s fisheries policy and that all the 
country’s vital economic interests were 
adequately protected by the EEA Agreement.
68
 
In 2002, Oddsson told a meeting of the 
German-Icelandic Chamber of Commerce in 
Berlin, that had Iceland not concluded the EEA 
Agreement, it would have joined the EU “a 
long time ago”.69  
 The discussion on EU membership 
remained relatively dormant until 1999–2000, 
when there was a brief surge in enthusiasm for 
membership driven by the fact that Iceland’s 
opportunity to influence legislation within the 
EEA was restricted to the preparatory stages 
and that this was unsustainable. The main 
argument was that Iceland should seek EU 
membership so as to be in a position to 
influence European legislation, the majority of 
which is automatically incorporated into 
Icelandic law on the basis of the EEA 
Agreement.
70
 Also, at the time, Iceland was 
becoming deeply involved in the Schengen 
scheme and began full participation in it on 25 
March 2001.
71
 The main reason behind 
Iceland’s joining Schengen was its 
participation in the Nordic Passport Union, 
which had been formed by Norway, Sweden, 
Finland and Denmark in 1957 and which 
Iceland had joined in 1965. When Denmark 
decided to join Schengen, it did so with a 
proviso stating that its decision was subject to 
the condition the Nordic Passport Union would 
continue to exist. This eventually led to all the 
                                                 
68 Ásgrímsson, H. (2000), Skýrsla Halldórs Ásgrímssonar 
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Routledge, p. 50. 
Nordic countries joining Schengen, both the 
EU and non-EU countries (Norway and 
Iceland).
72
 The Icelandic government was 
initially lukewarm about joining Schengen. 
Oddsson was sceptical. However, the issue 
enjoyed broad support with all parties in the 
Alþingi, with the exception of the Left Greens, 
who argued that it was costly and seemed to be 
just another step towards EU membership.
73
 
 
National Security 
 
National security issues have not been relevant 
to the question of EU membership, since the 
defence agreement with the United States and 
Iceland’s NATO membership provided 
plentiful security without EU membership.
74
 
However, in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, things took an unexpected turn. On 15 
March 2006, the US deputy-secretary of state, 
Nicholas Burns, announced in a telephone call 
to Iceland’s Foreign Minister, Geir H. Haarde, 
that the US would withdraw all its jet fighters 
and helicopters from Iceland by the end of 
September 2006 and severely reduce the US 
military presence.
75
 In reaction, Iceland’s 
prime minister, Halldór Ásgrímsson, suggested 
that this might provide a reason for Iceland to 
look seriously into the EU membership option 
as a guarantee of the country’s security.76 On 
30 September 2006, just six months after 
Burns’ phone call to Haarde, the last US 
soldier left Iceland.
77
 Since then, the Icelandic 
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authorities have taken over responsibility for 
running the air patrols over Iceland and 
Icelandic waters. Several defence agreements 
have also been concluded with neighbouring 
NATO countries, under which they provide air 
patrol services.
78
 However, the defence 
agreement with the US still stands and this 
explains why the US withdrawal has not had a 
significant impact on the attitude of the 
Independence Party towards EU membership.
79 
 
“God bless Iceland” 
 
For a long time after the founding of the 
republic, foreign investment was viewed with 
suspicion and through nationalistic eyes, with 
the fear that foreigners would buy up Iceland. 
This fear was unnecessary since, except for 
heavy industry, where the selling point has 
been cheap energy, Iceland has always found it 
difficult to attract foreign capital into its 
businesses.
80
 What might have been viewed by 
foreign investors as Iceland’s most lucrative 
investment opportunity, the fishing industry, is 
subject to severe restrictions on foreign 
investment.
81
  Foreign direct investment did 
not follow automatically after Iceland joined 
the EEA: no multinational companies set up 
branches in a country with fewer than 300,000 
inhabitants, with its own tiny currency that 
tended to fluctuate wildly. Even when the 
banks were being privatised at the turn of the 
century, efforts to attract foreign buyers were 
to no avail. However, soon after the beginning 
of the twenty-first century, this began to 
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change dramatically, with Icelandic FDI 
inflows far surpassing the EU average. Two 
factors in particular account for this: firstly, a 
huge investment in a new aluminum smelting 
plant in the east of Iceland and secondly, 
investment in the financial sector. 
 
Unfortunately most of the investment in the 
financial sector was actually done by 
Icelanders themselves through their companies 
abroad.
82
 Moreover, the country’s status as a 
stable, European, democratic and prosperous 
country was reflected in its ratings by 
international agencies, such as Moody’s and 
Standard & Poor’s. This meant that Icelanders’ 
access to international loans was almost 
unlimited. Thus, a generation of ambitious 
Icelandic businessmen set off to create their 
own multinationals.
83
  
 
It has been claimed that the biggest single 
factor in making this development possible was 
Iceland’s participation in the European 
Economic Area.
84
 Icelandic businessmen, 
however, claimed that they were more risk-
prone and quicker to make decisions than their 
European counterparts.
85
 Unfortunately this 
level of risk-taking did not pay off in the end.  
On the 6 October 2008 following serious 
turmoil in financial markets worldwide, the 
government of Iceland introduced emergency 
legislation empowering it to take over the 
entire Icelandic banking system.
86
 Prime 
Minister, Geir H. Haarde, addressed the nation 
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on radio and television to explain the gravity of 
the situation, concluding his address with the 
words “God bless Iceland”, which are not often 
heard from Icelandic politicians. Suddenly, 
Iceland changed from a rich and successful 
state with a growing financial infrastructure, 
banks and businesses that had made their 
presence felt in international markets, into an 
international pariah for its reckless financial 
behaviour.
87
  
 
Within a week after the Prime Minister’s 
address some 85% of the banking sector 
collapsed, together with the Icelandic currency, 
the króna.
88
 The Icelandic stock market, in 
which the nominal value of stocks had 
increased nine-fold from the beginning of the 
privatisation of the banks until their peak in 
2007, took a nosedive. The index went from 
9,016.5 points on 18 July 2007 to 218.8 on 8 
April 2009. Between 26 September 2008 and 
14 October of the same year it went down from 
4,277.3 to 678.4.
89
 On 24 October the Icelandic 
government asked the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to intervene to re-establish 
financial stability.
90
  
In connection with the fall of Landsbanki, and 
to protect its 300,000 British depositors, the 
UK government resorted to the “Landsbanki 
Freezing Order 2008”, by which all 
Landsbanki assets in Britain were frozen. To 
do this the UK government resorted to the 
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Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, which 
had been enacted in the wake of the September 
11
th
   attacks on the US and had never been 
used before against a Western state. For 24 
hours, the Central Bank of Iceland and the 
country’s Ministry of Finance were also under 
this Act, in company with entities such as Al 
Qaeda, the Taliban, North Korea and 
Zimbabwe. This was interpreted by many 
Icelanders as an act of aggression against the 
country.
91
 It vividly exposed the country’s 
vulnerability in the international order and 
gradually developed into the worst dispute 
Iceland had landed itself in since the financial 
crash began – the so-called Icesave affair.   
 
In the Icesave dispute Britain and the 
Netherlands sought to exact interest payments 
from Iceland for the money these countries 
decided to pay out to British and Dutch 
depositors after the fall of Landsbanki. In order 
to force Iceland to pay, they used their 
positions within the board of the IMF to delay 
emergency payments to Iceland during the 
worst phase of the crisis. On two occasions 
Iceland reached agreement with the British and 
Dutch governments on the payments, just to 
see the agreements overturned by Icelanders in 
referenda held at the initiative of the Icelandic 
president, Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson. Finally, 
the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) 
brought the case to the EFTA Court in 
December 2011, arguing that Iceland had acted 
in breach of the Deposit Guarantee Directive 
by failing to ensure the payment of a minimum 
compensation of EUR 20.000 per depositor,
92
 
and the European Commission led the 
prosecution. However, Iceland was cleared of 
all charges by the Court and on 28 January 
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2013, the case was dismissed. The EFTA 
Surveillance Authority is supposed to pay its 
own costs and the costs incurred by Iceland, 
which were significant, while the European 
Commission was ordered to pay its own.
93
 
 
This affair damaged the EU’s reputation in 
Iceland, which was perceived as siding with 
and helping Britain and the Netherlands against 
Iceland.  
 
To help Iceland find its way out of the crisis 
many alternatives were mentioned, in early 
2009 in the wake of the financial crash, such as 
EU membership and adoption of the euro. The 
exceptional circumstances created by the crash, 
and the public unrest which followed, led to 
the collapse of the government and snap 
parliamentary elections in the spring 2009. As 
a result the parties that were willing to support 
an EU membership application obtained a 
parliamentary majority. These parties were the 
Social Democratic Alliance, the Civic 
Movement, and the Progressive Party (even 
though the Progressive Party spelled out strict 
preconditions for it in its election agenda). 
However, the “historic” opportunity to form 
the first left wing majority government in the 
history of Iceland, led to a formation of 
government consisting of the Social Democrats 
and the (Eurosceptic) Left Green Movement. It 
was with the clear understanding that the 
government would pursue an application for 
EU membership as soon as possible with the 
aim of concluding negotiations for entry into 
the union, which would then be up to the 
population of Iceland to accept or refuse in a 
national referendum. The Left Greens also 
stressed their prerogative to be against a 
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concluded accession treaty. After five weeks of 
deliberations by the Alþingi’s Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and a week of heated debate in 
the Alþingi itself, Iceland applied for 
membership of the European Union on 16 July 
2009.  
 
Conclusion 
 
It took fifty years from the first hesitant steps 
by the “Government of Reconstruction” 
towards European integration to the application 
for membership of the European Union in 
2009. As the discourse in Iceland shows, 
although the application was not inconceivable, 
it would probably have taken more 
deliberations for further years or decades, had 
it not been for the unparalleled economic crash 
Iceland experienced in 2008 and the serious 
political turmoil it created in 2009. The 
outcome of the application procedure is far 
from certain. With general elections due in 
April 2013 and the parties opposing 
membership flying high in the opinion polls, it 
is possible that the application will simply be 
withdrawn later on this year, as happened in 
the case of Switzerland in 1992.
94
  
 
At least since the early 1960s, Iceland has been 
under pressure to participate in the European 
integration process. This pressure came from a 
number of sources, from increasing 
interdependence on the international stage and 
regional integration in Europe. As the Liberal 
intergovernmentalists claim, the EU has turned 
out to be a successful intergovernmental 
regime designed to manage economic 
interdependence through negotiated policy co-
ordination, which created economic incentives 
for peripheral European states to join the 
process. There have, however, been limits to 
the depth to which Iceland has been prepared 
to go at any given stage.  
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Certain options were available to Iceland 
relating to its geopolitical position and history. 
Thus, Iceland had the possibility of integrating 
gradually, without taking on the full 
obligations of EU membership. Majority 
governments in Iceland have always been 
coalition governments and until 2009 these 
always included either the Independence Party 
or the Progressive Party, both of which had 
extensive links with sectors that were sensitive 
to integration and felt threatened by it. The fact 
that the party that has most vocally opposed 
integration with the EU – the Left Greens – 
supported (or let through) an EU Membership 
application can be explained by the fact that 
the agricultural and fishing lobbies are not 
strongly represented in it. 
 
The sensitive domestic constraints in Iceland 
facing European integration are particularly 
related to the position of the fishing industry 
and to a lesser extent agriculture. The direct 
connections between two of Iceland’s parties, 
the Independence Party and the Progressive 
Party, which have served in government for the 
longest periods in Iceland‘s political history, 
and the fisheries and the agricultural sectors, 
obstructed moves towards an openly positive 
stance on EU membership within these parties, 
particularly in the Independence Party. It has 
thus been able, due to Iceland’s proportional-
representation voting system, to block moves 
towards EU membership, at least until 2009, 
when the way was cleared for an application 
because for the first time in the history of the 
republic,  the two parties with the most 
extensive connections with the fishing industry 
and agriculture were not represented in a 
majority government. If Iceland successfully 
negotiates EU membership, then the power of 
the leading sector will be tested in a national 
referendum.  
 
As of now Iceland is negotiating its entry into 
the EU. Out of 33 chapters, 27 have been 
opened and 11 concluded (in February 2013). 
The most difficult chapters, amongst them 
fisheries and agriculture, will not be opened 
before the general elections in April. It is for a 
new government to decide how to continue 
with this process. A new Europhile party, 
“Bright Future” has been getting good results 
in recent opinion polls, although it seems to be 
at the expense of the other Europhile party, the 
SDA. The Independence Party is adamant that 
if it enters government it wants a referendum 
on whether to continue the negotiating process 
or not, while the SDA argues that such a 
referendum would be “on nothing of worth”, 
since no one would know how a final accession 
agreement would look like. In the meanwhile, 
nationalist rhetoric might ride high again. The 
coming months are once again crucial for 
Iceland’s EU application. 
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